Panpsychism by Brüntrup, Godehard
in: New Catholic Encyclopedia Supplement 2012-13: Ethics and Philosophy. Ed. Robert L. Fastiggi. 4 vols. Detroit: Gale, 
forthcoming 2013. 
 1 
Panpsychism 
Analytic Philosophy; Mind, History and Philosophy of; Soul, Human. 
 
Bernardine Bonansea OFM 
Professor of Philosophy 
Catholic University of America, Washington, DC 
 
Godehard Bruentrup SJ 
Professor of Philosophy 
Munich School of Philosophy, Munich, Germany (2013) 
 
From the Greek pan meaning “all,” and psyche meaning “soul,” panpsychism is a version of 
ontological monism. It is the thesis that mental being is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the 
universe (cf. Seager 2009, 206). 
Panpsychism has a long-standing history in philosophy (cf. Skrbina 2005). Panpsychism can be 
traced back to pre-Socratic philosophers, such as Thales (cf. Aristotle 411a7), but it is in the 
Renaissance that it assumed a systematic form. Francesco Patrizi (1529–1597) developed the idea of 
a divine mental light pervading the universe, which he called “pampsychia” (why he used pam instead 
of pan is not clear). Gerolamo Cardano (1501–1576) defended the doctrine of a world soul 
informing the universe as a psychic principle and Giordano Bruno (1548–1600) stated even more 
clearly that the world soul is “the formal constitutive principle of the universe and all that is 
contained in it” (De la causa, principio et uno, Venice 1584). 
The systematic apex of panpsychism is the philosophy of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716). It 
originates from his criticism of Descartes’s concept of matter: “extensionem non esse absolutum, 
quoddam praedicatum, sed relativum ad id quod extenditur sive diffunditur” [extension is not 
absolute, as said above, but relative to what is extended or diffused] (Leibniz G IV, 394). The 
intrinsic nature of matter is rather that all reality is made up of monads considered as mentally 
propertied units reflecting the entire universe. 
Especially at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, philosophers from 
different traditions have defended versions of panpsychism: In Germany, Gustav Theodor Fechner 
(1801–1887) revived the idea of an animated universe, which he held to be a unitary system 
penetrated by the spirit of God and including all other minor “systems” as sentient subjects. Rudolf 
Hermann Lotze (1817–1881) restated Leibniz’s theory of un-extended, conscious monads, and 
Friedrich Paulsen (1846–1908) presented physical reality as a manifestation of a supreme psychic 
unit.  
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In the United States, Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914) maintained that mind and matter are but 
different aspects of a single feeling process. Josiah Royce (1855–1916) shared Fechner’s view of the 
psychic aspect of all things. As one of the most prominent proponents of panpsychism, 
Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) stands out. He pictured the world as a process of events 
rather than of thing-like substances. These processes are bipolar: mental and physical. They have 
been aptly described as Leibnizean monads with windows. 
In France, the spiritualistic movement of Jean Gaspard Félix Ravaisson (1813–1900) reached its 
climax in the theory of élan vital as the immanent principle of evolution, an idea defended also by 
Henri Bergson (1859–1941). In Le cœur de la matière, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881–1955) claimed 
just like Whitehead in his 1925 Science and Modern World that the idea of evolution leads to 
panpsychism: The creative activity of matter can be explained only if mental being is present in the 
world at its very beginning. 
At the end of the twentieth century, there was a renaissance of panpsychism in analytic philosophy 
of mind and metaphysics due to the seemingly insurmountable problems of reductive materialism. 
David Chalmers (2003) and Galen Strawson (2006) argued that in order for physicalism to allow for 
the emergence of mind, the nature of physical reality must contain more than what physics de   
ribes: human consciousness needs to be grounded in the intrinsic natures of physical reality. This 
can be spelled out in two ways: (1) Russellian Monism, which claims that although there must be an 
intrinsic nature of matter, knowledge of most characteristics of this nature is concealed from us; (2) 
panpsychism, which, in contrast to this Kantian move, argues that the intrinsic basis of the material 
world is indeed experiential (or mental) in nature. Thus, contemporary panpsychism claims to 
establish coherent middle-ground between dualism and physicalism. 
Common to all expressions of panpsychism are two arguments: (1) The genetic argument, which is 
based on the philosophical principle ex nihilo, nihil fit (“nothing comes out of nothing”). If human 
con   iousness is to evolve from a physical basis, then rudimentary forms of mental being need to be 
present at the very basis of this evolutionary process. Both Thomas Nagel (2012) and William James 
(1890, 149) have defended versions of this argument. (2) The argument from intrinsic nature, which has 
been developed as a reaction to the claim that a complete ontology in terms of relations is possible. 
This view might be inconsistent, because of model theoretic consequences of the Löwenheim-
Skolem theorem: relational patterns alone leave the intrinsic nature of concrete individuals 
underdetermined. Panpsychists argue that the intrinsic nature of matter is known in the case of 
human consciousness. Being ontological monists, they claim that the intrinsic nature of matter in 
general is mental being or proto-mental: “Physics is the knowledge of structural form, and not 
knowledge of content. All through the physical world runs that unknown content, which must surely 
be the stuff of our consciousness” (Eddington 1920, 200). 
There have been other arguments in favor of panpsychism: for example, the ethical strategy 
employed by David Skrbina (2005, ch. 10) and the ecological strategy employed by Freya Mathews 
(2003, ch. 6). 
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Panpsychism has been applied to scientific thought. For example, panpsychistic interpretations of 
quantum mechanics have been advanced by David Bohm’s theory (1993) of active information and 
the implicit order, by the Orch-OR model of human consciousness developed by Roger Penrose 
and Stuart Hameroff (1996), by Henry Stapp’s theory of a mindful universe (2007), and by Michael 
Epperson’s Whiteheadian reading of quantum decoherence (2004). 
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